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It is nearly impossible to produce an adequate historical balance of 
the various contemporary interpretations of the metaphysics of 
Thomas Aquinas. The article pays special attention to the numer-
ous studies recently published concerning the Thomistic doctrines 
of being, personal being, participation, and the metaphysical con-
cept of creation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
It is notorious that extensive sectors of contemporary philo-
sophy and culture have proposed minimizing the importance of 
metaphysics, if not eliminating it altogether, dethroning it from its 
status as the culmination of knowledge, where it serves as the root 
or foundation of all other sciences. Metaphysics is conducted “in 
the past tense,” so to speak; as Habermas has said, we are today in 
a postmetaphyisical tense. 
On the other hand, the encyclical Fides et ratio by John Paul II 
is also famous for proposing a reawakening of philosophy with a 
metaphysical dimension. This document proposes that philosophy 
in the strict sense, and not merely a look-alike, is an indispensable 
necessity, if we desire in reality a process of thought which may in 
some manner solve the general crisis in philosophical, scientific 
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and cultural thinking. It is only the search for an ultimate truth 
(which to a great extent corresponds to metaphysics, the science 
pursued since Aristotle) which can suppress or prune back contem-
porary mistrust in reason. Thus a truly metaphysical philosophy is 
necessary —as John Paul II affirms— in order to pass beyond 
empirical data, in order to arrive, in its search for truth, at 
something absolute, ultimate and fundamental. The Pope does not 
indicate any particular metaphysics, out of the many which have 
been produced throughout history; rather, his call is directed 
towards the realization, construction or revitalization of a 
philosophy of being, i.e. a metaphysics which has transcendental 
and transcendent reach. The affirmation of the possibility of a 
return to metaphysics cannot be rejected out of hand as being 
utopian or illusory. In addition, in the same document the Pope 
speaks of the “permanent novelty of the philosophy of Thomas 
Aquinas.”1 I believe this proclamation is something that can be 
responded to; it should be responded to by philosophers of 
differing schools and interests, since the proclamation is not merely 
rhetorical, nor simply a declaration of good intentions. 
 
 
1. THE DIFFICULTY OR NEAR IMPOSSIBILITY OF A HISTO-
RIOGRAPHIC BALANCE CONCERNING THE METAPHYSICS OF 
THOMAS AQUINAS IN THE 20TH CENTURY 
 
The paradox is obvious; during moments in which many believe 
that metaphysics is useless, if not nonexistent, in this so-called 
post-metaphysical age, it is very difficult, not to say almost 
impossible, to find a suitable balance that can minimally synthesize 
the contemporary interpretations of the metaphysics of Thomas 
Aquinas. He is surely the author about whom the most has been 
written during the 20th century, and on whom the most activity has 
__________________________ 
1. The ideas discussed here can be found, among other places, in paragraphs 
5, 55, 83, etc., of the Encyclical Fides et ratio. 
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been focused in philosophical forums and philosophical/scientific 
activities. 
It is necessary to take into account, first of all, that Thomas is 
not only his philosophy, but also his theology, and his mysticism, 
and so on. The intermingling of the philosophical, theological, 
exegetic and mystical aspects of his thought has given rise to 
different Thomisms, and even to various non-Thomistic readings 
of Thomism. But there is no doubt that the relevance and quantity 
of the studies published in recent years about Thomistic philosophy 
reveal the vitality of a tradition of thought which draws its life 
from those roots. 
Although an extensive bibliography could be mentioned here, I 
will indicate only five recent books simply as examples which 
touch upon our topic: those of Bonino,2 Davies,3 Kerr,4 Prouvost,5 
and Shanley.6 Quite surprisingly, some of these attempts at 
interpretation, which refer to the history of Thomism or which 
claim to offer an overall vision of contemporary Thomism or 
Thomisms, do not acknowledge the best results of other 
interpretations and their authors. 
In my view, a potential synthesis also should have to include 
the results of that splendid method of philosophical investigation 
that consists of the comparison of philosophers with each other. 
__________________________ 
2. S. T. BONINO, El tomismo hoy. Perspectivas caballeras, Escuela de 
Teología San Dámaso, Madrid, 2002, which contains interesting observations on 
the life and death of the neo-Thomist project in the 20th century, the defense of an 
open Thomism, etc. In addition, his article Être thomiste, in Thomistes ou de 
l’actualité de saint Thomas d’Aquin, Namur, 2003, pp. 15-26. This book, as well, 
contains various studies on philosophy, theology, history of Thomism, etc. 
3. B. DAVIES (ed.), Thomas Aquinas: Contemporary Philosophical 
Perspectives, Oxford, 2002. 
4. F. KERR, After Aquinas: Versions of Thomism, Oxford, 2002. It is 
necessary to also mention another book, also edited by Kerr, Contemplating 
Aquinas: On the Varieties of Interpretation, London, 2003, which contains 
excellent studies by authors such as M. D. Jordan, R. te Velde, and A. Williams. 
5. G. PROUVOST, Thomas d’Aquin et les thomismes. Essai sur l’histoire des 
thomismes, Paris, 1996. 
6. B. J. SHANLEY, The Thomist Tradition, Kluwer, Dordrecht-Boston, 2002. 
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Here, the bibliography would branch out still more; indeed, 
Thomas Aquinas has been compared with almost every other 
author, although the most abundant bibliography corresponds to 
comparisons of Aquinas with Descartes, Kant, and Heidegger (in 
this regard the well-known works of Max Muller, Siewert, Caputo 
and Hemming should be remembered); even Heidegger himself, as 
is notorious, in Grundfrage der Philosophie (vol. 45 of his 
complete works) emphasized the unthinkably amazing agreement 
between Thomas and Nietszche in their explanation of the 
Aristotelian assertion that truth is mainly in the intellect. We must 
not forget to mention, even if briefly, the school which has called 
itself the “school of Transcendental Thomism” (Maréchal, Rahner, 
Lonergan) and the so-called Analytical Thomism (whose best-
known representatives are perhaps Geach and Anscombe along 
with Kenny and Haldane;7 here the number of authors is far too 
many to mention more than only a few. 
Given the impossibility of a historiographic and speculative 
synthesis, I will only refer to a limited selection of the questions 
and authors of the 20th century.8 Historiography is of interest to me, 
but I must candidly admit that the speculative dimension is more 
interesting. While one must adequately recognize the invaluable 
advances in historiography, I prefer to focus on advances or 
deepening in speculative discovery. 
The well-known work of Agustín Nifo, in his 13th disputation 
on Book VII of the Metaphysics of Aristotle says: 
__________________________ 
7. I omit here works by authors already cited. In order to give a brief 
panorama of Anglo-American Thomism, I note the following works, certainly 
differing greatly among themselves: F. KERR, “Thomas Aquinas: Conflicting 
Interpretations in Recent Anglophone Literature,” in Aquinas as Authority: A 
Collection of Studies Presented at the Second Conference of the Thomas Instituut 
te Utrecht, Leuven, 2002, pp. 165-186; B. J. SHANLEY, “Analytical Thomism,” in 
The Thomist, 63/1 (1999), pp. 125-137; G. A. MCCOOL, The Neo-Thomists, 
Milwaukee, 1994. A critique of McCool is found in J. F. X. KNASAS (ed.), 
Thomistic Papers, vol. 6, Notre Dame, 1994. 
8. A brief panorama of the history of Thomism can be found in 
R. CESSARIO, Le thomisme et les thomistes, Paris, 1999. 
THOMISTIC METAPHYSICS: CONTEMPORARY INTERPRETATIONS 
405 
“Expositor Thomas raro aut nunquam dissentit a 
doctrina peripatetica, fuit enim totus peripateticus et 
omni studio peripateticus, et nunquam aliud voluit nisi 
quod peripatetici.” 
I think that it must be recognized that the Thomistic body of 
doctrine is closely related to that of Aristotle; to forget this or 
ignore it, at least in core areas of philosophy, leads to taking 
mistaken paths in the interpretation of Thomas Aquinas as a 
speculative thinker. Nevertheless, this is not an obstacle to 
recognizing at the outset that Aquinas goes beyond the Stagirite in 
the central aspect of all metaphysics, namely the question of 
being. Thomas is Aristotelian, but not merely Aristotelian. In 
mentioning this, I intend to underline both the influence of the 
Stagirite as well as the originality of Thomism. 
Thomistic metaphysics, as Geiger has indicated, is not merely a 
baptized Aristotelian metaphysics. In this sense, Thomas is not 
Aristotle-plus-the-doctrine-of-creation. The “progress” of the 
metaphysics of Thomas over that of Aristotle is undeniable in 
many different areas. I agree with the conclusion of Geiger, who 
—in his extensive work on the comparison of both 
metaphysicians—9 establishes a conclusion which is modest but 
very useful, namely, that it is wise not to read Aristotle by means 
of St. Thomas, or vice-versa, instead restoring to each author his 
own particular identity. I would also advise, in addition, the 
wisdom of not underestimating the influence of Aristotle in 
Aquinas. 
Certainly, an exploration of the diverse interpretations of 
Thomistic metaphysics could be achieved via other excellent 
__________________________ 
9. L. B. GEIGER, “St. Thomas et la metaphysique d’Aristote,” now in Penser 
avec Thomas d’Aquin, Fribourg, 2000, a recompilation of studies of L. B. Geiger 
published by R. IMBACH. In this book there are, in addition to the complete list of 
publications of the great Thomist Geiger, some of his most well-known and best 
works; among them, “Les idées divines dans l’oeuvre de S .Thomas”; “L’homme 
image de Dieu, à propos de Summa Theologiae, I, 93, 4”; “Abstraction et 
séparation d’apres S. Thomas in De Trinitate q. 5, a. 3”, articles which have 
represented a discovery or rediscovery of some aspects of Thomism. I will refer to 
some of these later.  
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topics, such as participation, the doctrine of the transcendentals, or 
analogy, the existence and nature of God, etc., but all of these 
ultimately attain their authentic meaning, and consequently display 
a particular metaphysics, based on the conception which they have 
about being. 
An Italian author, G. Ventimiglia, has produced an outstanding 
and profound status quaestionis on the studies of Thomistic 
metaphysics centered on the problem of being, as introduction to 
an excellent and novel investigation. I agree with his general 
viewpoint, while having a few reserves on the author’s own 
doctrine in the central part of his magnificent book,10 the 
discussion of which I will not venture into here; nevertheless, I will 
follow his introduction in order to highlight what I consider to be 
the most relevant of the Thomistic interpretations on being and the 
person. Ventimiglia considers that, in regards to the history of the 
problem of being in Aquinas in the 20th century, there exists a 
division into three great areas. He emphasizes that this corresponds 
to three generations of philosophers, although from my point of 
view, it is not really appropriate to speak of generations, because 
the representatives can belong to different eras; nevertheless the 
division is very useful for capturing the great lines of effort at 
systematizing or synthesizing the problem. 
In the first place, in the 20th century, at least until approximately 
the 1930’s, being in Aquinas was considered to be that of Aristotle 
(Manser may be considered the most important representative of 
this current, in his influential book the Das Wesen des 
Thomismus);11 secondly, beginning with the works of Gilson12 and 
__________________________ 
10. G. VENTIMIGLIA, Differenza e contradizione. Il problema dell’essere in 
Tommaso d’Aquino: esse, diversum, contradictio, Milano, 1997. 
11. G. M. MANSER, La esencia del tomismo, 2nd ed., Madrid, 1953. 
12. The contribution of E. Gilson to the renewal of Thomistic metaphysics is 
exceptional. This affirmation also applies to many topics in the first science, as 
well as to the differentiation between Aristotelian form and Thomistic being. Even 
if on this point the evolution was slow, nevertheless it was achieved by the 
beginning of the 1940’s, with the 2nd ed. of L’etre et l’essence and the 4th edition 
of Le thomisme. A good study of the totality of his work is that by R. ECHAURI, 
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Fabro,13 in the 1930’s and 1940’s, “being” in St. Thomas was 
considered to be the notion of being as act, which constitutes a 
profoundly original idea, very different from the Aristotelian 
notion. Finally, in the 1960’s, a third current arose that considers 
the Thomistic notion of being to be neither original, nor 
Aristotelian, but simply Neoplatonic. This third current was 
originated by Cornelia de Vogel, but is also represented by Hadot 
and in part by D’Ancona Costa; it is important to emphasize that 
this current is primarily dedicated, with exemplary research, to the 
study of Neoplatonism —the most distinguished representative of 
this school is W. Beierwaltes—; they only make reference to the 
concept of being in Aquinas in a collateral, if sometimes extreme, 
fashion; this is especially true of Kremer.14 
My readers will pardon my insistence that historiographic 
explanations are certainly necessary, so that thought does not lose 
its way and philosophy does not become simply poetry. While we 
depend on historiographic data, which certainly will always have to 
be pursued, it is necessary to go beyond the data by means of 
speculative thought, thereby extending the data. I will allude 
briefly to both types of question in the course of this article. 
 
 
_________ 
El pensamiento de Etienne Gilson, Pamplona, 1980. See also the references there 
to the many Gilsonian works. 
13. I consider C. Fabro to be the most complete Thomistic thinker of the 
20th century, both for his decided renewal of fundamental points of the 
philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, as well as for his prodigious knowledge about 
modern and contemporary metaphysics. It is impossible to do justice here, even 
minimally, to the enormous relevance which this author has had in the areas 
stated, with his 30 extensive books and nearly 900 articles. Recently, his Opere 
complete have begun to be edited by EDIVI, Roma, 2004. 
14. See G. VENTIMIGLIA, op. cit., pp. 5 ff. In large part I have accepted the 
ideas of the status quaestionis which this author presents. I recommend the 
reading of the entire book, although it will be seen later on that I do not share all 
of his points of view. In this book there will be found references to the works of 
the authors I cite, as well as a more precise study of the successive phases of the 
problem of the comprehension of the Thomistic notion of being. 
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2. THE QUESTION OF BEING: THOMISTIC ARISTOTELIANISM 
 
The question of being in Thomas Aquinas has brought with 
itself a great proliferation of works, impossible even to enumerate 
within the framework of this conference, beginning in the first 
decade of the 20th century, when Garrigou-Lagrange timidly began 
to indicate that Thomistic doctrines to a great extent were 
fossilized and that it would be necessary to investigate new senses 
and aspects of the Thomistic notion of being. That author, and 
many others (Olgiati, Masnovo, Sertillanges, Ramírez, Forest) who 
performed excellent work, paid attention to this topic and opened 
the door to further research. However, the renewal of Thomism, 
and in particular our topic area, a notion of being not identified 
with Aristotelianism, was late in flourishing, in particular until the 
studies of Maritain, Gilson and Fabro, whose works nevertheless 
are different in many ways. Many other authors, indebted to those 
we have mentioned, and specially to Fabro, have discovered or 
rediscovered accents and perspectives in the treatment of the 
question of being, which implied a radical course change initiated, 
as I said, in the 30’s.15 
The greatest metaphysical discovery of Aristotle, the notion of 
act, ends precisely there: in the concept of activity or perfect act;16 
__________________________ 
15. In addition to the references to the authors alluded to in the book by 
Ventimiglia, one may encounter a succinct and clear portrait of the most relevant 
Thomistic authors of the 20th century in B. MONDIN, La metafisica di San 
Tommaso d’Aquino e i suoi interpreti, Bologna, 2002. The first part of this book, 
entitled Le interpretazioni della metafisica tomistica nel ventesimo secolo, briefly 
studies the contributions of Grabmann, Garrigou-Lagrange, Masnovo, Olgiati, 
Sertillanges, Vanni Rovighi, Gilson, Maritain, Fabro, Forest, de Finance, 
Raeymaeker, Giacon, Lobato, etc. Also in this book one will encounter the most 
important bibliographical references for each author. 
16. In this regard, among the lengthy bibliography which is available, I refer 
to the relevant articles by L.Polo, who has written, in my opinion, highly 
illuminating pages on the notion of act and its various senses in Aristotle; See 
L. POLO, Curso de Teoría del conocimiento, vol. 1, 2nd ed., Pamplona, 1987, 
lesson 1, and the corresponding chapters in IDEM, Presente y futuro del hombre, 
Madrid, 1993, and of his Introducción a la filosofía, 3rd ed., Pamplona, 2002. See 
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for this reason, while even the Stagirite recognized that the 
existence of any essence must be an act, he did not even glimpse 
the real distinction between being as act and essence, nor that 
essence in act, while active temporally speaking, is equivalent 
rather to dynamism or essential potency; essences would be modes 
of actuality. The closest that Aristotle came, in my opinion, to 
anticipating the Thomistic doctrine is in the well-known 
expression: “being is never the essence of anything; thus being is 
not a kind”; some of the first great Thomists of the 20th century, 
e.g. Raeymaeker and especially Manser, interpreted this text in the 
Thomistic way, when —as is well known nowadays— what 
Aristotle was emphasizing in that text of the Posterior Analytics is 
that no being has an essence that consists of being, but rather that 
of being such-and-such a being; the essence of things does not 
consist of being things, but of being such things; any distinction 
between the being (einai) of a being, on the one hand, and what 
that being is, or its essence (ousía) on the other hand, does not exist 
in the work of Aristotle, and therefore it is not possible to speak of 
a real distinction between being and essence in the Aristotelian 
ontology.17 The foundation of this affirmation rests on the 
Thomistic inquiries into being and the consequent real 
distinction. Being understood, in the manner of Thomas, per 
modum actualitatis absolute, reaches a theoretical development 
which was unknown to the Stagirite. As is known, for Fabro this 
new manner of understanding being, as an emergent act of reality, 
constitutes the theoretical originality of Thomist speculation with 
respect to classical thought, both Platonic and Aristotelian, as well 
as Patristic thought and the contemporary doctrines of other 
schools.18 
_________ 
also the excellent work by R. YEPES, La doctrina del acto en Aristóteles, 
Pamplona, 1993. 
17. R. ECHAURI, “Esencia y existencia en Aristóteles”, in Anuario 
Filosófico, (1975), pp. 119-129. See also the chapter on Aristotle in E. GILSON, 
Being and Some Philosophers, 2nd ed., Toronto, 1949. 
18. C. FABRO, Tomismo e pensiero moderno, Roma, 1969, p. 103. In this 
book, a recopilation of several articles, two are especially relevant to our 
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In my opinion, it is much more clear that there is an overcoming 
of Aristotelianism on the part of Thomas in the problem of 
developing a considered metaphysical conception of the 
person. The notion of personal being requires an intensification of 
the concept of being, as Thomas developed it, especially 
concerning the ascent to a supraformal ambit. 
 
 
3. THE THOMISTIC ORIGINALITY CONCERNING BEING AND ITS 
EXTENSION OR APPLICATION TO PERSONAL BEING 
 
Let us recall several well known ideas: being is the act of the 
forms themselves, says Thomas Aquinas; for that reason, grasping 
the notion of being is possible only if the formal order is surpassed 
and the real order is reached, in which being realizes the forms 
themselves, insofar as it is their act.19 The originality of the 
Thomistic position —as de Finance has said— can be expressed by 
saying that the positive pole of the real moves from the form to 
being, with the latter acquiring the supreme relevance in the 
metaphysical order, up to the point that, so long as being is not 
conceived as devoid of formal content (precisely because it 
transcends all content), one has not reached the deep metaphysical 
originality of Thomas Aquinas; and, in addition, one has not 
surpassed the logical-formal order. The overcoming of formalism 
can only be obtained in a metaphysical doctrine that conceives 
being as act, and which considers it, precisely because it is, as the 
archetype of actuality. 
_________ 
topic: “Dall’ente di Aristotele all’esse di S. Tommaso” (pp. 47-103) and “Il 
problema dell’esse tomistico” (pp. 103-134). 
19. See among many other studies, A. L. GONZÁLEZ, Ser y participación, 
3rd ed. Pamplona, 2001; A. LLANO, “Actualidad y efectividad,” in his book 
Metafísica y lenguaje, 2nd ed., Pamplona, 1997; G. E. M. ANSCOMBE; 
P. T. GEACH, Three Philosophers, Oxford, 1973. See also A. J. P. KENNY, 
Aquinas on Being, Oxford, 2002; J. F. X. KNASAS, Being and Some Twentieth-
Century Thomists, New York, 2003. 
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If we apply these ideas to the conception of the person, one can 
see the enormous difference between Aristotelianism and 
Thomism. In the classic and well-known Aristotelian doctrine of 
the senses of “being,” what sense of being characterizes the 
person? A suitable, deep answer, in the Aristotelian line, will 
conclude that within the many ways of attributing being, the person 
must occupy a preferred place, since “to be” is most properly and 
truly said of subsistent individuals: being is properly and truly of 
the subsistent subject, as Thomas says in a well-known text. Being 
belongs to primary substance first because it is the real subject; the 
person is in a primary sense; the proper subject of being. 
While the substantial sense of person is certainly reasonable 
and true, and thus not only not to be rejected, but also 
indispensable for an explanation of the person, it does not thereby 
have to be the final explanation in the speculative order. In 
addition, this does not, I believe, require abandoning the substantial 
explanation of the person, based ultimately on an explanation of 
subsistence. Through continuing the Thomistic conception of 
being, there is space for an ultrasubstantial explanation of the 
person which does not reject its substantial character. 
The formalism, real or presumed, of some interpretations of 
Thomism on this point, can only be surpassed by going beyond the 
predicamental order, through the surpassing of the formal order, 
with the notion of supraformality, with an adequate intensification 
of the real distinction between essence and being. Applying this to 
our topic, this means that the substance or form, so to speak, is not 
lowered in its category, it is not “discounted”; rather, its height and 
dignity are increased by its being integrated into being, which —as 
Thomas Aquinas said— is the form of forms. Being confers a 
higher unity, it is —if it can be expressed in this way— maximally 
integrative. Being, considered in a supraformal manner, unites or 
integrates the forms, the formal differences. And for this reason, as 
I see it, the static and dynamic visions of the person are only two 
aspects of the same reality. 
As Fernando Haya has excellently shown, St. Thomas achieves 
a speculative perspective that overcomes formalism in his 
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consideration of the person via his real distinction between essence 
and being: “While it is certain that Thomas expresses his thought 
in formal terms, that is, considering being itself as form of forms, 
or as the most formal of all ... one must bear in mind ... that the 
notions of essence and act are not only not incompatible, but are 
transcendentally harmonious or complementary. In this context the 
notion of supraformality was formulated, as that of complete being 
of form in identity: a consideration of being that is essential, but 
not essentialist.”20 Using ideas of Haya himself, I will highlight 
that the person is constituted in the ambit or plane of act; the 
person is (personal) being; the person is act, a (created) act, and 
therefore only within the conceptual horizon of Thomism can it be 
understood, explained and displayed in the dimension of act (of 
being); the person cannot be explained in the ambit or plane of 
potency, which pertains or corresponds to the essence with 
reference to the being which it receives, and concerns the capacity 
of the essence (potency of being) insofar as it manifests the need 
for formal specificities and the subsequent differentiation of the 
essential form. This act of being cannot be more than nonidentical 
with respect to the potency of being or essence. And all that there 
is in a being must be configured and considered as coming from its 
radical principle, which is being. 
There is included here also all that refers to creaturely 
dynamism. Action prolongs being and therefore the creature is, at 
its base, dynamic. Being is not the operation, but the operative 
dynamism does not exist, is not produced, without being, which 
founds, aids and accompanies the dynamism of the person. We 
return again to the same place: being is not of itself constrained by 
the essence; or better, the determination of the potency of being 
__________________________ 
20 F. HAYA, El ser personal. De Tomás de Aquino a la metafísica del don, 
Pamplona, 1997. I permit myself to emphasize that this book is excellent from 
many points of view: for its high philosophical speculation, and for the force of its 
theoretical argumentation, originality, and clear proof of what can be done, in our 
day and age, with a vigorous advance in the metaphysics of St. Thomas, directed 
precisely by his reliance on analogy. See also, by the same author, Tomás de 
Aquino ante la crítica. La articulación trascendental de conocimiento y ser, 
Pamplona, 1992. 
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does not constrain the act of being to the point that it becomes 
crystallized. Being, so to speak, overcomes or overflows this 
constriction or determination, and continues accompanying its 
multifaceted operations (and without forgetting that being is 
distinct from them, given that —in all that which is created— it is 
nonidentical with all that is not itself). 
The consideration of the person in the horizon of being, in the 
line that we are indicating, leads to the conclusion that the 
structuring of the person is not the person; or said in another way, 
the person “is structured by means of an essential configuration 
which is not properly the person himself, but rather his most 
intimate possession or gift.”21 I will emphasize this point a bit 
more, following the investigations of Haya, which ultimately have 
their inspiration in the philosophical doctrines of Leonardo Polo 
(Haya affirms that this author’s doctrine is a splendid philosophical 
gloss on the condition of the human person as creature of God). 
Following the strict doctrine of St. Thomas, being cannot be 
considered a tearing apart, striking or throwing-off of the divine 
creative action. The creature is not a part, nor does it separate itself 
from the Absolute, “but rather it is a reality that is given. This 
giving is as radical as reality. For this reason he says that the 
creature is not presupposed: it is created from nothing.”22 
Taking into account the great Thomistic discovery of the real 
distinction between essence and being, whose deepening and 
continuation are being spoken of here, it is difficult to propose an 
essentialism which adequately explains the essential perfecting of 
the human being; essential perfecting is only possible if there is a 
superior instance to that which is constituted by the essence. Being 
__________________________ 
21. F. HAYA, El ser personal cit., p. 296. See section 3 (“La persona en el 
orden del actus essendi”) of the fifth chapter (“La persona a la luz de la distinción 
real de esencia y ser”) of the cited book, pp. 276-298. From these pages I have 
taken, on occasion with my own perspective, some ideas or expressions 
22. L. POLO, “Tener y dar,” in La existencia cristiana, Pamplona, 1996, 
p. 131. 
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is that superior instance to the essence.23 “Therefore the being of 
the human person —says Haya— is not already given. If we 
propose being as something given, constituted, we do not move out 
of dependence upon the essential conditions of the operative 
dynamism. The antecedence of being in change is of a different 
sort than that of the essence. In order to explain human perfecting 
... it is necessary to consider that in the human person, apart from 
that which is given, there is the personal dimension, or better the 
person, to whom it has been given. That which has been given to 
the human person, that which is already given, is the essence.”24 
The human being is not definable in this conception, which in my 
judgment extends Thomist conceptions, by his capacity to have, 
but rather by his capacity to give; the human being is a personal 
being, which ultimately is constituted as intimacy. “The human 
being is a personal being because he is able to give. From the 
perspective of the person, giving signifies contributing. Contri-
buting makes having possible.”25 
The person is constituted more by self-giving than by 
having. Precisely —and here I follow the excellent explanations of 
Falgueras—, if being consists in donation, in giving, there is space 
for an explanation that is much more adequate than other at the 
speculative level, since if that which specifies being is not having 
but rather giving, that which the human being has been given can 
only be completed in gift, in self-giving: to be is to give.26 
__________________________ 
23. Haya remarks, concerning the comparison of the Thomist conception of 
the person with that of Hegel: “Why is it necessary that something manifest itself 
when it is definitely already in existence? It seems to me that in the Hegelian 
philosophy this may be the point most difficult to respond to: the colossal self-
movement of the Hegelian absolute towards its own self-realization does not 
finally have more reason to be than being thus, or that which is in itself over that 
which provides this realization for itself. But this is nothing more than a great 
circle without explanation.” F. HAYA, El ser personal cit., pp. 306-307. 
24. F. HAYA, El ser personal cit., p. 307. 
25. L. POLO, “Tener y dar,” cit., p. 132. 
26. See I. FALGUERAS, Crisis y renovación de la metafísica, Universidad de 
Málaga, Málaga, 1997, p. 84. This book not only offers a magnificent exposition 
of Thomistic doctrine, but also a proposal for continuing the intellectual project of 
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In order to finalize these quick allusions to one of the most 
interesting metaphysical fields, speculatively speaking, among that 
which follows from the Thomist doctrine, I include a further 
quotation from Haya. If it is recognized that “definitively, the real 
distinction between being and essence is also the principle of its 
operative dynamism ... the being of the human being is not given 
... is it then still to be achieved? This can be a manner of 
expressing the immanent finality of personal action in its 
confluence towards being itself, which is its ultimate and radical 
principle. But it should not be thought that this means a 
subordination of the metaphysical priority of being to that of 
action. Quite the contrary: precisely because being is 
metaphysically primary, it is not possible to reach it by any action 
or operation, which belongs strictly to the order relative to 
essence. Action, including immanent action, even if it were 
perfective of the essence, does not achieve the rank of complete 
identity with that which is principal.”27 
Certainly that which has just been said does not lead to a 
disconnection between being and action; without ignoring the real 
distinction between being and essence, which is the Thomistic 
discovery par excellence, in this interpretation the aforementioned 
connection is produced by means of the habits, as L. Polo has 
highlighted with profusion and profundity, as well as other authors 
who, each in his own way, have been inspired by Polo’s thought 
and frequently follow him;28 the proposal of Polo concerning habit 
_________ 
Aquinas. I would like to especially underline the high intellectual quality of this 
book. 
27. F. HAYA, El ser personal cit., p. 308. 
28. In addition to other books already noted, I reiterate the relevance for this 
topic of: L. POLO, “Tener y dar,” cit.; ID., “El conocimiento habitual de los 
primeros principios,” in Nominalismo, idealismo y realismo, 2nd ed., Pamplona, 
2001, pp. 171-188 (especially the sections entitled “La consideración de los 
hábitos intelectuales desde el acto de ser” y “El hábito de los primeros principios 
como conocimiento del actus essendi”). See also J. F. SELLÉS, Hábitos y virtud, 
Cuadernos de Anuario Filosófico. Serie Universitaria, Pamplona, 1998, 3 
vols. Concerning the relevance of this topic, see the broad and well-documented 
ÁNGEL LUIS GONZÁLEZ 
416 
is both new and original, based on Thomistic thought, but 
continuing and broadening it. To uphold that the connection or 
articulation alluded to is carried out by the habits not only does not 
weaken or eliminate the real distinction between essence and being 
in the human being, but in fact confirms the creaturely non-
identity: the creaturely condition of the human being, once given, 
is irrevocable. 
I, person, being. With incisive interpretation of the Thomistic 
texts, within this same interpretative line, we find investigations 
such as those of Ignacio Falgueras (Crisis y renovación de la 
metafísica), the two cited books of Fernando Haya (Tomás de 
Aquino ante la crítica, and El ser personal), the work of Juan 
Fernando Sellés (La persona humana, 3 vols.), whom I will cite 
later, and in part that of Miguel García-Valdecasas (El sujeto en 
Tomás de Aquino. La perspectiva clásica ante un problema 
moderno), to whom I will allude below; in addition, there are many 
other splendid works by authors such as Juan García,29 José 
Ignacio Murillo,30 Salvador Piá,31 etc. It is clear that these latest 
contributions correspond to a many-hued and multiform 
intensification in that most original notion of being held by 
Thomas Aquinas, and which go beyond, in my opinion far beyond, 
the splendid affirmations and consequences highlighted by Gilson, 
Geiger and especially by Fabro (it will be sufficient to recall the 
definition of the human being which Fabro proposed in La nozione 
metafisica di partecipazione,32 following St. Thomas in his 
_________ 
study by S. COLLADO, Noción de hábito en la teoría del conocimiento de 
Leonardo Polo, Pamplona, 2000. 
29. J. GARCÍA GONZÁLEZ, Teoría del conocimiento humano, Pamplona, 
1998. 
30. J. I. MURILLO GÓMEZ, Operación, hábito y reflexión. El conocimiento 
como clave antropológica en Tomás de Aquino, Pamplona, 1998. 
31. S. PIÁ TARAZONA, El hombre como ser dual. Estudio de las dualidades 
radicales según la Antropología de Leonardo Polo, Pamplona, 2001. 
32. See C. FABRO, La nozione metafisica di partecipazione secondo San 
Tommaso d’Aquino, Torino, 1950, p. 337, and the explanations which are offered 
there. 
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doctrine, when he notes that the real human ens is an originating 
possibility). 
The new discoveries or deepenings in certain aspects do not 
imply necessarily a lessening in value of the preceding doctrines: 
in that manner, the previous affirmations of renowned interpreters 
of Thomas —some of which I have mentioned before— could 
come to be considered as inexact. Nevertheless, the explanation or 
intensification of being is, and will always continue to be, a motive 
for deepening, expanding and development, first, in the widely 
varied problems of metaphysics, and also, in accordance with these 
findings —which cannot anchor themselves alone—, in the 
application to diverse metaphysical topics, and thus to the other 
philosophical domains. The interpretations and proposals here 
alluded are some of those which are possible, not the only ones, as 
should be clear. An open and living Thomistic metaphysics must 
irremediably be plural in its intensification via its ultimate 
principles, since it is precisely this life and openness that prevent 
Thomism from crystallizing into a dead system. 
The findings of Thomas Aquinas, now rediscovered and 
profoundly investigated by illustrious Thomists (I must mention, 
among others, Montagnes,33 Owens,34 Cardona,35 Elders,36 
González Alvarez,37 García López,38 Clavell,39 Sanguineti),40 
__________________________ 
33. B. MONTAGNES, La doctrine de l’analogie selon Saint Thomas, 
Louvain, 1963. 
34. Cf. J. OWENS, St. Tomas Aquinas on the Existence of God: The 
Collected Papers of Joseph Owens, Albany, New York, 1980; IDEM, Aquinas on 
Being and Thing, Niagara, New York, 1981; IDEM, An Interpretation of Existence, 
Milwaukee, 1968; IDEM, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics, 
3rd ed., Toronto, 1978. 
35. Cf. C. CARDONA, La metafísica del bien común, Madrid, 1966; IDEM, 
Metafísica de la opción intelectual, Madrid, 1973; IDEM, Metafísica del bien y del 
mal, Pamplona, 1987; IDEM, Memoria y olvido del ser, Pamplona, 1997. 
36. Cf. L. J. ELDERS, The Philosophical Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas, 
Leiden, 1990. 
37. Among the numerous works by A. GONZÁLEZ ALVAREZ, it is pertinent 
to cite here Tratado de metafísica, vol. 1: Ontología, 2nd ed. repr., Madrid, 1987; 
vol. 2: Teología natural, Madrid, 2nd ed., 1986. See also his “Santo Tomás de 
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require in the present day, and will always require, further 
development. Metaphysics always will be the “sought-for science.” 
The interpretation that I have noted in a particular subject, such as 
the person,41 seems to me to be quite relevant (mainly for its 
consequences in anthropology and ethics),42 but is only one of 
various possible interpretations. For this reason also I hasten to 
emphasize that, for instance, the notion of subsistence in the 
definition of the person is not illegitimate. On the contrary, it is 
necessary to count on that which is, and which presupposes 
subsistence, but —in my opinion— if it is considered in an isolated 
manner it will be insufficient. There should be continued treatment 
and speculative broadening (not personalist, as that term is 
understood currently within the so-called personalist movement, 
despite being of interest for other reasons) of the person as 
intimacy and all that which this carries with it. As L. Polo has 
_________ 
Aquino y el pensamiento contemporáneo”, in Tommaso d’Aquino nel suo settimo 
centenario, vol. 1, Napoli, 1975, pp. 129-136. 
38. See by J. GARCÍA LÓPEZ, among others, his extensive and systematic 
treatise Metafísica tomista: ontología, gnoseología y teología natural, Pamplona, 
2001. See also his Estudios de metafísica tomista, Pamplona, 1976. 
39. Cf. L. CLAVELL, El nombre propio de Dios según Santo Tomás, 
Pamplona, 1980. 
40. Cf. J. J. SANGUINETI, La filosofía de la ciencia según Santo Tomás, 
Pamplona, 1977. 
41. The specific bibliography on the person, from a metaphysical 
perspective, is impossible to cover fully. I cite here a few studies, with differing 
structures and aims, which I consider to be excellent in their field: E. FORMENT 
[among whose systematic works I note] “La persona humana,” in A. LOBATO 
(ed.), El pensamiento de Sto. Tomás para el hombre de hoy, vol. 1, Valencia, 
1995, pp. 685-883; T. MELENDO, Introducción a la antropología de la persona, 
Madrid, 1995; J. MARTINEZ PORCELL, Metafísica de la persona, Barcelona, 
1992; See also, from a more theological perspective, J. M. GARRIGUES, “La 
personne humaine dans sa réalité intégrale selon saint Thomas,” in 
S. TH. BONINO (ed.), Thomistes ou de l’actualité de Saint Thomas d’Aquin, cit., 
p. 99-111. 
42. See also, among many other works which could be cited on this subject, 
that of A. M. GONZÁLEZ, Moral, razón y naturaleza: una investigación sobre 
Tomás de Aquino, Pamplona, 1998. An excellent comparison between Scheler and 
Aquinas is provided by M. G. SANTAMARÍA GARAI, Acción, persona, 
libertad. Max Schler - Tomás de Aquino, Pamplona, 2002. 
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noted in his Antropología Trascendental one should not consider 
the subsistence as consummated in itself or without self-
revelation.43 
 
 
4. THE THOMISTIC NOTION OF BEING AND THE PRESUMED (OR 
REAL) NEOPLATONISM OF THOMAS AQUINAS 
 
“This which I call being”—says Thomas Aquinas, in my 
opinion conscious of the reach of his discovery— “is the most 
perfect of all, the actuality of all acts; nothing can be added to it 
which is more formal or which determines it.” This famous text of 
De potentia, q. 7, a. 2 ad 9, finishes, as is known, by affirming that 
“for this reason Dionysius says that, while that which lives is 
nobler than that which exists, nevertheless being is nobler than life, 
because that which lives not has life only, but it has being with its 
life.”44 This quote of Pseudo-Dionysius enables me to allude —
only an allusion— to the excellent research produced in recent 
years, making reference —in favor of and in opposition to— 
Thomas’s presumed absence of originality in his doctrine of being. 
As is well-known, the influence of Neoplatonism in Thomas 
has been demonstrated, progressively more and more, by various 
authors (I include myself among them, if I am allowed a bit of 
vanity, because I wrote on this topic many years ago, following 
Fabro). It seems opportune not to forget that, in general, for many 
__________________________ 
43 See L. POLO, Antropología trascendental, vol. 1: La persona humana, 
2nd ed., Pamplona, 2003; vol. 2: La esencia humana, Pamplona 2003. Along the 
same lines, See the three books by J. F. SELLÉS, La persona humana, 
vol. 1: Introducción e historia, Bogotá, 1998; vol. 2: Naturaleza y esencia 
humanas, Bogotá, 1998; vol. 3: Núcleo personal y manifestaciones, Bogotá, 
1999. By the same author I must also mention Conocer y amar. Estudio de los 
objetos y operaciones del entendimiento y de la voluntad según Tomás de Aquino, 
2nd ed., Pamplona, 2000. See also de J. GARCÍA GONZÁLEZ, “Metafísica y 
Antropología: la noción moderna de sujeto,” in J. GARCÍA; T. MELENDO (eds.), 
Actualidad de la metafísica, Contrastes. Suplemento 7, Málaga, 2002, pp. 93-103. 
44. De potentia, q. 7, a. 2, ad 9. 
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medieval philosophers, the symbiosis of Plato and Aristotle was a 
common assumption; as Girgenti has shown,45 medieval 
philosophy is based on diverse forms of mediation between Plato 
and Aristotle; indeed we may even speak (if in a somewhat 
extreme fashion) of a platonized Aristotelianism and an 
aristotelianized Platonism. 
Let us remember, in addition to Fabro and Geiger themselves, 
who must be considered as being pioneers in the recognition of this 
influence, the works of Henle46 and Little,47 in addition to the well-
known works of Norris Clark.48 There are authors, nevertheless, in 
the wake of the current begun by Cornelia de Vogel,49 who 
emphasized the Platonic and Neoplatonic character of Thomistic 
philosophy; I indicate only a brief selection: Faucon,50 Hankey,51 
O’Rourke.52 On the one hand, in the earliest research during the 
1950’s, it is possible to say that, while recognizing the Platonic 
influence, the researchers had a tendency to minimize it or limit it 
to certain areas of Thomas’s philosophy. On the other hand, in 
some of the more recent authors that I have mentioned one sees the 
other extreme, where the researchers assert that the philosophy of 
St. Thomas is almost entirely Platonic or Neoplatonic. In this 
__________________________ 
45. See G. GIRGENTI, “La metafísica de Porfirio como mediación entre la 
henología platónica y la ontología aristotélica, base del neoplatonismo medieval”, 
in Anuario Filosófico, 38/1 (2000), pp. 151-162. 
46. R. J. HENLE, Saint Thomas and Platonism. A Study of the “Plato” and 
“Platonici” Texts in the Writings of St. Thomas, 2nd ed., The Hague, 1970. 
47. A. LITTLE, The Platonic Heritage of Thomism, Dublin, 1950. 
48. Among others, W. N. CLARK, “The Problem of the Reality and 
Multiplicity of Divine Ideas in Christian Neoplatonism,” in D.J. O’MEARA (ed.), 
Neoplatonism and Christian Thought, Albany, 1982, pp. 109-127. In the same 
book, pp. 97-108, there is also a study by C. FABRO, “The Overcoming of the 
Neoplatonic Triad of Being, Life and Intellect by Thomas Aquinas.” 
49. By C. DE VOGEL, in addition to other older and well-known works, see 
Rethinking Plato and Platonism, Leiden, 1986. 
50. P. FAUCON, Aspects néoplatoniciennes de la doctrine de saint Thomas, 
Paris, 1975. 
51. W. J. HANKEY, God in Himself, Oxford, 1987. 
52. F. O’ROURKE, Pseudo-Dionysius and the Metaphysics of Aquinas, 
Leiden, 1992. 
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respect it is possible to emphasize, as has been mentioned, that 
authors like Hadot53 and Ruffinengo, along with others, affirm that 
the Thomistic notion of intensive being is already in Porphyry, and 
that the identification of Subsistent Being with God is in many 
Neoplatonic authors.54 (It is also necessary to recall that in the 
search for where Thomas Aquinas could have encountered the 
notion of being, there have been postulated many different authors 
as the possible source —e.g. Boethius, the School of Chartres, etc. 
However, on this point, in reference to intensive being, I consider 
the affirmations of E. Alarcón to be better grounded.55 He 
demonstrates that the fundamental nucleus of the doctrine of being 
according to Aquinas can be found in his master, Albert the Great. 
One of the most relevant lines of research concerning the 
Neoplatonic interpretations about our topic is based on studies of 
the Liber de Causis.56 The author who has studied this issue in 
greatest depth,57 and in general is the most even-handed researcher 
on the Platonism of Aquinas, is Cristina D’Ancona Costa.58 She 
demonstrated, and I believe that adequately, that the identification 
__________________________ 
53. Among the many historical investigations by P. HADOT, I highlight 
Porphyre et Victorinus, Paris, 1968. 
54. A synthesis of the development of these studies, their authors and their 
corresponding bibliographic references can be found in the cited work by 
G. VENTIMIGLIA, pp. 22-33. See especially the bibliographic references in the 
book to works by W. Beierwaltes, P. Hadot, P. P. Ruffinengo, etc. 
55. E. ALARCÓN, “San Alberto Magno y la ’Epistola Alexandri de principio 
universi esse’,” in Actas del I Congreso Nacional de Filosofía Medieval, 
Zaragoza, 1992, pp. 181-192. 
56. See the Thomistic commentary in a recent edition: TOMÁS DE AQUINO, 
Exposición sobre el “Libro de las causas”. Introducción, traducción y notas de 
J. CRUZ CRUZ, Pamplona, 2000. 
57. See a partial compilation of the articles on this topic in C. D’ANCONA 
COSTA, Recherches sur le “Liber de Causis”, Paris, 1995. 
58. A splendid summary of the Platonic influence in the Medieval era, and 
on Thomas Aquinas in particular, with a very complete reference, in two 
appendices, of all the relevant studies published on the topic, can be found in the 
work of IDEM, “Historiographie du platonisme médieval: le cas de Saint 
Thomas,” in S. TH. BONINO (ed.), Saint Thomas au XX siècle, Actes du colloque 
du Centenaire de la “Revue thomiste” (25-28 mars 1993 -Toulouse), Paris, 1994, 
pp. 198-217. 
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of God with being was encountered by Thomas in the Liber de 
Causis and in the De divinis nominibus of Dionysius. These texts 
—she emphasizes— imply that the Platonic doctrine was not 
entirely admitted. Ventimiglia, summarizing the position of 
D’Ancona Costa, emphasizes the fact that Thomas knew clearly 
that the Liber de causis was not an Aristotelian work, but also 
noted that this does not mean that the Liber was a pure Platonic 
commentary on the Elementatio theologica of Proclus, as can be 
easily seen by simply checking the frequent allusions to the thesis 
of De Divinis nominibus. Against the thesis of a Porphyrian origin, 
D’Ancona Costa59 notes that the doctrine of Thomas appears to 
have a Dionysian origin. 
I am inclined to note that research will provide more fruitful 
results along these lines. The historical researches undertaken by 
recent authors on this question are of high quality. Among these, 
the most relevant, I believe, is Aertsen, and particularly his recent 
study on the trascendentals,60 even if I do not share his thesis of a 
Thomistic distancing with respect to certain capital points of 
Platonism. 
The current focus of research upon the trascendentals is 
resulting, indeed, in an excellent crop of research, and has resulted 
in recent books of high quality. To limit ourselves to the Spanish-
speaking world, it is necessary to highlight the two volumes 
__________________________ 
59. See C. D’ANCONA COSTA (ed.), “Introduzione,” in TOMMASO 
D’AQUINO, Commento al “Libro delle cause,” Milano, 1986, p. 7-164. In this 
work one will encounter the ideas highlighted above. In addition, I have more 
than once drawn expressions and ideas from G. VENTIMIGLIA, op. cit., pp. 34 ff. 
60.  See J. AERTSEN, “The Platonic Tendency of Thomism and the 
Foundations of Aquinas’s Philosophy,” Medioevo, 18 (1992) pp. 53-70, and 
above all his Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals: The Case of Thomas 
Aquinas, Leiden, 1996, recently translated to Spanish in the Colección de 
Pensamiento Medieval y Renacentista, Pamplona, 2003. Among the excellent 
treatments of this area of ontological problems, should be noted certain chapters 
of the posthumous book by E. GILSON, Las constantes filosóficas del ser, also 
recently published in the same book series, Pamplona, 2005. 
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written on this subject by Antonio Millán-Puelles61 and some of 
the works of Leonardo Polo.62 
I share the posture of Ventimiglia in this respect, when —
in his book entitled Differenza ed essere— he highlights that 
ultimately the ontological conception of Thomas is not only 
not completely reconcilable with Neoplatonism, but that 
Thomas himself consciously elaborated certain essential 
aspects of this doctrine precisely while attacking it.63 These 
investigations certainly imply an advance over that which 
Fabro had written in his day, when the first voices about 
excessive “Neoplatonizing” in St. Thomas began to be 
heard. I am referring to his well-known work, Platonism, 
Neo-Platonism, and Thomism: Convergencies and Diver-
gencias.64 In sum, in my view, in Thomistic metaphysics the 
influence of Neoplatonism is in general inferior to that of 
Aristotelianism, and particularly regarding the subjects I have 
mentioned here: Being and God. 
Going beyond the historiographic point of view, I allow myself 
to emphasize the speculative content that, in my opinion, is found 
in Thomas: the Platonic subsisting separation of the Idea is 
criticized in many places by Thomas Aquinas. The various formal 
perfections of things do not need to be attributed to a separated first 
principle, but rather since all belong to the perfection of being it is 
necessary to establish a separated Principle that is Being, and 
__________________________ 
61. A. MILLÁN-PUELLES, La lógica de los conceptos metafísicos, vol. 1: La 
lógica de los conceptos trascendentales, Madrid, 2002; vol. 2: La articulación de 
los conceptos extracategoriales, Madrid, 2003. 
62. There can be cited here, in this regard, the numerous references to the 
topic in L. POLO, Curso de Teoría del conocimiento, Pamplona, 1998-2005, 4 
vols., and especially volume 1 of his Antropología trascendental, already 
mentioned. 
63. G. VENTIMIGLIA, Differenza e contradizione cit., p. 36. I cannot allude 
here to other derivations and discussions on this topic, despite their interest. For 
further information on the highly relevant contributions by authors such as Berti, 
Aertsen, etc., see ibidem, pp. 37-45. 
64. C. FABRO, “Platonism, Neo-Platonism, and Thomism: Convergencies 
and Divergencies”, in The New Scholasticism, 44 (1970), pp. 69-100. 
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which is the cause of being and therefore of all the other 
perfections possessed by a being and which follow upon being. 
The Platonic “real separation” is criticized by Aristotle, but 
because he did not take into account the via resolutionis from ens 
into esse, Aristotle did not arrive at the consideration of the 
Subsistent Being. The recognition of being qua being undercut the 
possibility of establishing the subsisting separation of the Platonic 
forms, and on the other hand, the vertical ascent does not lead to a 
Form, but to the Subsisting Being itself. Regarding this point it is 
sufficient to allude to the convergence, harmony or superior 
agreement, that Thomas indicates in the third chapter of De 
susbtantiis separatis, that bears the significant title “In quo 
conveniant positiones Platonis et Aristotelis”. In the separated All, 
as Fabro and his disciples noted with precise designation, being is 
encountered simpliciter et uniformiter, precisely as non-
participated, while on the other hand its causality becomes obvious 
as a result of its transcendental participation. Precisely, once more, 
the notion of being and the doctrine of the real distinction provide 
pertinent solutions to the difficulties and theoretical obstacles 
which occur in the metaphysical problem of creation, and in the 
difference between the finite and the infinite. Here, in addition, as 
in the previous case alluded to, concerning personal being, the 
speculative intensification produces original explanations of the 
problems without needing to consider as inexact earlier 
explanations. Metaphysics —as it seems to me St. Thomas 
understood it— is always open and worthy of being extended, 
broadened and continued. 
Moving forward from doctrines found in current scholars, it is 
necessary to emphasize that created being is different from the 
being which is the Creator, and that means that the former is not 
identical, or what is to say the same thing, that it is neither an 
identity nor pure act. The distinction between being and essence is 
not mutual opposition, but difference; created being is different 
with respect to identity, essence is different with respect to created 
being. The priority between the two is hierarchical, not 
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temporal.65 Reality is not identical, it is non-identical, and from the 
perspectives described here, that is to say, from the rejection of an 
essentialist vision, it is necessary to highlight that if being is 
person, then its non-identity brings with it the fact that the “I” is 
more than itself: the personal nucleus is not facticity, but rather 
ascension, ascendant reality, operative dynamic.66 Thus it must be 
emphasized, in order to avoid mistakes, that the difference which 
non-identity carries with it, i.e. composition, does not weaken the 
unitary reality of the creature, as Thomas Aquinas frequently notes. 
In my opinion, all that has been said up to now does not nullify 
a correct understanding of the doctrine of participation. As it is 
notorious, some authors, based on the previous way of explaining 
things, or in similar ways, relegate the metaphysical doctrine of 
participation to a secondary plane. In the Thomistic doctrine, 
participation appears in such abundance and in such a multitude of 
topic areas that it is impossible to explain Aquinas’s philosophy 
without referring to it. This doctrine is primary and not secondary 
in Thomas, that is to say, it extends to the fundamental nucleus of 
metaphysics, and it is not, on the contrary, a doctrine of merely 
explanatory character. 
I consider that the doctrinal explorations of Fabro (La nozione 
metafisica di partecipazione, Partecipazione e causalità) and of 
Geiger (La participation dans la philosophie de s. Thomas 
d'Aquin) continue, as a whole, to be valid; in my opinion, 
participation by composition and participation by similarity are not 
incompatible; the emphasis in the former (Fabro) does not negate 
participation by similarity (Geiger). Both can be followed and be 
deepened in some of their elements without weakening the 
principles which they attain to; both conceptions (and not only 
participation by composition) can give intensity to what we might 
call the active or dynamic “seal” of similarity. This concept also 
__________________________ 
65. The ideas contained in this paragraph are taken from the work already 
mentioned by I. FALGUERAS, Crisis y renovación de la metafísica, pp. 85 ff. See 
also section IV: “La distinción real como diferencia intrínseca,” and section 
V: “El esse y el habens esse,” pp. 85-100. 
66. See F. HAYA, El ser persona cit., pp. 316 ff. 
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belongs to the explanations of Fabro, of course including his later 
consideration of exemplarism with respect to efficiency. This 
exemplarism is certainly fulfilled between the Creator and the 
created being, inasmuch as the Absolute is Being and that which is 
finite has being; but this very similarity bears within itself the 
greatest possible dissimilarity, not of degree but of order.67 
Exemplarism is a consequence of transcendental participation.68 
The similarity must be transcendental in order to be able to express 
the transcendence of God, since the clear Thomistic formulations 
in this respect cannot be forgotten: of that which is predicated both 
of God and of creatures, is predicated of God essentially, and of 
creatures by participation.69 
But from there, in my opinion, the questions which I mentioned 
before can and must be explained, since it affects the dynamic 
slope of the concept of participation by similarity, as the studies 
alluded to that bear a different interpretative “seal”. One of them is 
the consideration that creation as participation in divine being 
implies that participation is assimilation. This assimilation is an 
active reception, not passive: to be is to receive; and this is perhaps 
the only case where this reception is not produced ad modum 
recipientis, but rather ad modum dantis esse, which implies not a 
__________________________ 
67. See on this point F. OCÁRIZ, “Cuestiones de metafísica tomista en torno 
a la creación,” in Divus Thomas, (1974), pp. 403-424. See also C. CARDONA, 
Olvido y memoria del ser, Pamplona, 1997, pp. 412 ff. 
68. Regarding to this topic in general, allow me to refer once again to my 
book Ser y participación, 3rd ed., Pamplona 2001. On the metaphysical problem 
of creation in Aquinas: J. M. ARTOLA, Creación y participación, Madrid, 1998; 
IDEM, “Consideraciones sobre la doctrina de Santo Tomás acerca de la creación,” 
in Ciencia Tomista, (1990), pp. 213-229; an overall view by the same 
author: IDEM, “Creación y gobierno,” in V. RODRÍGUEZ; ET AL., El pensamiento 
de Tomás de Aquino para el hombre de hoy, vol. 2, Valencia, 2001, pp. 325-415; 
P. MAZZARELLA, “Creazione, partecipazione e tempo secondo S. Tommaso 
d’Aquino,” in Studia Patavina, (1982), pp. 309-335; A. GHISALBERTI, “La 
creazione nella filosofia di S. Tommaso d’Aquino,” in Rivista di Filosofia Neo-
scolastica, (1969), pp. 202-220; A. MOLINARO,“La nozione di creazione,” in 
Studia Patavina, (1965), pp.175-206, 401-444; I. GUIU, “Metafísica de la 
creación según Santo Tomás,” in e-aquinas, 1/8 (2003), pp. 28-43. 
69. See, among other passages, De potentia, q. 7, a. 7, ad 2. 
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descent but rather an elevation.70 The relation of dependence 
produced by creation, according to the Thomistic doctrine, does 
not imply that it be a passion; and certainly similarity cannot carry 
with it community of nature, since in that case the finite and the 
infinite would be intermixed, which would be a pantheism in one 
of its various modalities. 
This speculative consideration of the Thomistic elements with 
which creation is considered bring with them a wealth of 
formulations and expressions, which important present-day 
interpreters have developed, and in which even the notion of 
participation itself appears to be excluded (although here too, in 
my opinion, the exclusion is not necessary, or rather, there is room 
for a purified metaphysical doctrine of participation). I refer to the 
metaphysical explanations, which could be labeled as “donative,” 
to which I have sufficiently alluded above in reference to the 
metaphysical comprehension of the person. The author most 
relevant in this respect is Ignacio Falgueras,71 who has in one way 
or another been followed in these points by F. Haya, and also by J. 
Pérez Guerrero in certain of his explanations. Also relevant are the 
works of J. García, J. F. Sellés, J. I. Murillo and other authors 
already cited above. It seems to me to be only fair to recognize the 
__________________________ 
70. This is the thesis of the article by J. PÉREZ GUERRERO, La creación 
como asimilación a Dios. Un estudio desde Tomás de Aquino, Pamplona, 
1996. Based on texts of Aquinas focusing on similarity, and on the work of 
Leonardo Polo, this book stands out among recent publications. I do not share all 
his conclusions: in my opinion, there is too strong a separation between the so-
called participation by composition and participation by likeness. As I noted 
above in the main text, exemplarity is not eliminated by constitutive or causal 
transcendental participation. 
71. Not being able myself to shortly explain his conception in a manner that 
does it justice, I provide here a short quotation, and suggest again that readers 
should read the text itself: “… creation is a donation in which God, the pure act of 
being, gives a pure or total gift; that is, in creation God gives that which gives, 
i.e. the act of being. The creature, gift of creation, is also a giver, but not, like the 
creating existence, a giving of giving, but rather a repeater or a giver of gifts. Only 
God is capable of giving giving, the creature gives gifts which are not, in their 
turn, able to give. In the creature, giving and that which is given, do not coincide, 
while in the Creator, they do. The pure identity gives giving, the pure difference 
gives gifts.” I. FALGUERAS, Crisis y renovación de la metafísica cit., p. 84. 
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influence, on the one hand, of the metaphysical doctrine of 
Leonardo Polo in these authors, and to underline that, from here 
on, these works have their own originality in the speculative 
interpretation of the topics treated. 
The critiques of the doctrine of transcendental participation by 
Rudi te Velde72 and of Pergamino,73 who note certain deficiencies 
in the treatment of that doctrine, either inadequacy or insufficient 
thought in certain points in respect to the Thomistic texts, do not 
eliminate in my view the speculative strength nor the nuclear 
elements of Thomistic participation as understood by the Italian 
thinker. That in certain occasions Thomas’s exposition might be 
“coarse,” or inadequate, does not thereby invalidate the entire 
doctrine. The important thing is to improve upon it or to continue 
it. (In fact, Rudi te Velde and Teresa Bergamino, whose works are 
certainly excellent, follow quite in the wake of Fabro’s studies, 
reiterating to a great extent the position of that great Thomist). 
On this subject, although I cannot develop my remarks too 
extensively, I consider that the best and most up-to-date exposition 
of the doctrine of participation is that proposed by Wippel, who is 
also in my opinion the best English-speaking expositor of the 
whole of the Thomistic metaphysics.74 On the one hand, this 
author shares even-handedly in the contraposition between the 
doctrines of participation by composition of Fabro and that of 
participation by assimilation, imitation or formal hierarchy, as 
expounded by Geiger.75 In addition, he opens a perspective which 
is certainly interesting and relevant on the possible delimiting of 
__________________________ 
72. SeeR. A. TE VELDE, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas 
Aquinas, Leiden, 1995. 
73. See F. BERGAMINO, “La necessità assoluta nell’essere creato in 
Tommaso d’Aquino. Sintesi ragionata di Contra Gentiles II, c. 30,” in Acta 
Philosophica, 8 (1999), pp. 69-77. 
74. Amongst the many works of J. F. WIPPEL it is necessary to cite: The 
Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas, Washington, 2000; Metaphysical 
Themes in Aquinas, Washington, 1984; and Thomas Aquinas on the Divine Ideas, 
Toronto, 1993. 
75. See IDEM, “Thomas Aquinas and Participation,” in Studies in Mediaeval 
Philosophy, Washington, 1987, pp. 117-158. 
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the metaphysical doctrine of participation: he adduces texts 
(frequently applied to other matters or referred to and explained in 
the interior of a determined systematization) which seem to refer to 
being as the direct object of participation in each thing: the things 
have or possess being in a partial manner (that is, they participate 
in their being). This would be a distinct manner of understanding 
participation, which it seems to be does not eliminate others, and to 
which attention should be paid. When St. Thomas affirms that 
“quaelibet res participat suum esse creatum”,76 and in other 
similar texts, he uses the term “participate” with “being” as direct 
object.77 
It cannot be forgotten that Thomas Aquinas, for example when 
explaining the fourth way, the metaphysical manner par excellence 
of ascending to the existence of the Absolute, speaks of grades of 
being, and not of grades of essence; the —to speak of it thusly— 
natura essendi is excluded by transcendental participation, as I 
have intended to explain elsewhere.78 
Returning to take up the previous ideas within this interpretative 
framework, it is necessary to reiterate that only the Absolute 
Creator can provide being, create, precisely because He is Being, 
simpliciter, without restriction. It is even necessary to note that, for 
Thomas Aquinas, “creator” is a name of God in a consequential 
sense. The Absolute is Being, and because He is Being, if He 
wishes, He creates. And that which He creates are beings, 
supposita or beings comprised of essence and being; but, as is 
notorious, creation refers properly to being, and via being it also 
__________________________ 
76. THOMAS AQUINAS, In I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 2. 
77. “On still other occasions, when Thomas refers to such entities (or 
natures) as participating in esse, he seems to have in mind immediately the esse 
which is realized within such entities as their particular acts of being (actus 
essendi). While this usage may strike Thomas’s reader as unusual, it may be 
helpful to recall that frequently in such contexts Thomas uses ’participate’ 
(participare) as a transitive verb with esse as its direct object.” J. F. WIPPEL, The 
Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas cit., p. 121; See the entire section 
(“Participation in esse”), pp. 110-124, and the following discussion on 
participation, composition and limitation (pp. 124-131). 
78. See A. L. GONZÁLEZ, Ser y participación cit., pp. 105-132, 218 ff. 
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concerns or reaches essence.79 The well-known formulate of De 
causis, which Thomas makes his own, indicates that “the first of 
the things created is being.” According to the Thomistic doctrine, 
the essence is created, precisely because being attains to, is 
attributed to, the essence, and not vice versa. 
It seems to me, given these affirmations, that it is not necessary 
to insist that the ontological primacy of being does not damage, or 
better yet, does not involve denigration of the essence, which is not 
limit, negativity, deprivation, or much less negation, in the 
Spinozan sense, insofar as it involves a determination of 
being. Nevertheless, I consider it worthwhile to highlight that the 
positivity of essence, in Thomistic metaphysics, must always be 
preserved.80 The only error, on this point, derives from the mistake, 
despite all that I have just emphasized, of understanding being 
simply as the actuality of the essence, without noting that in this 
way it is conceived in function of the essence and not the other 
way around, a point which is one of the most important aspects of 
the Thomistic speculative discovery. 
The positivity of essence brings with it, among other things, 
that the composition of essence and being must also be seen from a 
positive perspective. This composition does not prejudice the unity 
of beings; for that reason, the real distinction is not a defect or 
factor causing multiplicity in beings, but rather the axis on which 
its unity is based, as has been astutely pointed out by García-
Valdecasas.81 Although I cannot develop this idea further here, the 
deepening and speculative development of the real distinction of 
essence and being constituted, in my view, the most adequate and 
__________________________ 
79. Among the numerous texts which could be listed here, see In III Sent., 
d. 11, q. 1, a. 2 ad 2: “creatio non respicit naturam vel essentiam, nisi mediante 
actu essendi; qui est primus terminus actus creationis.” 
80.  Concerning essence, see F. UGARTE, Metafísica de la esencia. Un 
estudio desde Tomás de Aquino, Pamplona, 2001. See also the introductory study 
by E. FORMENT in TOMÁS DE AQUINO, El ente y la esencia, Pamplona, 2002. 
81. See M. GARCÍA-VALDECASAS, El sujeto en Tomás de Aquino. La 
perspectiva clásica sobre un problema moderno, Pamplona, 2003. 
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congruent treatment that can be brought to the philosophical 
problem of identity and difference.82 
A last clarification: although it might not be necessary, I would 
like nevertheless to insist that the dependency of the finite upon the 
infinite does not result in a devaluation of the finite; this latter 
exists in a positive way, with its own exclusive being. God does 
not create ex se his own being. The being of the created thing is not 
difference from the pure Identity in which the Absolute consists: it 
is different. For that reason there is no place for a supposed reditio 
(of God to God). Finite subjectivity, because it is founded, cannot 
fulfill any absolute reditio (Eckhart, Cusa). The pure Identity does 
not refer to creation, inasmuch as God is independent of the created 
thing, He does not move towards the finite thing. It is the other 
way around: the finite thing is because it is created. There cannot 
be any deus creatus, or deus ocassionatus (Cusa).83 The being of 
the Absolute is identical with himself; the finite being is non-
identical in and of itself, as soon as it is created. Because it has 
been created, it is affected by or received in an essence. The 
Thomistic doctrine, tested and later continually deepened and made 
more profound, of the real distinction of essence and existence, 
derived from Thomas’s original conception of being, provides a 
metaphysical explanation of the relations between the finite and the 
infinite. 
In the doctrine of Thomas, so far as I understand, if creation is 
creation of being, and is performed without motion, that which is 
implanted in reality is dependent being; dependence unequivocally 
defines creation, according to Aquinas. Given this, as Falgueras 
has brilliantly and opportunely noted, dependence on the Pure 
__________________________ 
82. See I. FALGUERAS, Crisis y renovación de la metafísica cit., and 
especially chapter 3, “Consideraciones filosóficas en torno a la distinción real 
esse-essentia,” a work which in my opinion constitutes one of the most lucid 
contributions to the interpretation and extension of Thomism. 
83. See A. L. GONZÁLEZ, “La articulación de la trascendencia y de la 
inmanencia del Absoluto en ’De visione Dei’ de Nicolás de Cusa, introduction to 
the Spanish translation of NICOLÁS DE CUSA, La visión de Dios, 4th ed., 
Pamplona, 2001, pp. 9-58. 
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Identity which is God “requires enjoying autonomy, since the more 
the being depends on God, the more free it becomes”.84 Falgueras 
also notes pertinently that the unconditioned simplicity in which 
the Absolute consists, implies that its creative act is also simple 
and unconditioned. But to depend on a simple and unconditioned 
act is not to lack unity, nor autonomy nor power, but rather to have 
in a guaranteed fashion one’s own unity and power.85 Being which 
has been given, has been given in “free and private property.” The 
creature is pure dependence, and in respect to the creature God is 
absolute transcendente.86 
It should be remembered that Thomas Aquinas defined on one 
occasion the creation as pure dependence: “Creation is not 
movement, but rather the very dependence of the created being on 
the principle by which it is constituted”.87 Creation, he also 
affirms, “is not properly a mutation, but rather a certain relation 
with respect to the creator in consonance with its dependent 
being”.88 The total dependence which is called creation —says 
Rassam— is unilateral, and expresses an ascending orientation 
relative to the Absolute, but does not authorize a descending 
dialectic, given that the Absolute is transcendent, and is not 
numbered among relative beings. 
On this great metaphysical inquiry depends a correct 
articulation of immanence and transcendence of the Absolute in 
regards to that which is created, which is the metaphysical problem 
par excellence. From a Thomist perspective, and with applications 
to all modern metaphysics, thanks to the metaphysical concept of 
expression, there have been developed interesting explanations 
__________________________ 
84. See FALGUERAS, I., Crisis y renovación de la metafísica, cit., p. 88. See 
also his article Realismo trascendental, in Futurizar el presente. Estudios sobre la 
filosofía de Leonardo Polo, Málaga 2003. 
85. I. FALGUERAS, Crisis y renovación de la metafísica cit., note 152. 
86 See, among other texts of L. POLO, La libertad trascendental, Pamplona, 
2005, p. 35. 
87. Summa contra Gentiles, II, 10. 
88. Compendium Theologiae, c. 99. 
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concerning the relations of the finite and the infinite.89 As is well 
know to anyone who has studied metaphysics, Thomas Aquinas 
provides reasonable arguments for the compatibility of ontological 
transcendence with the gnoseological immanence of the Absolute, 
the compatibility of the supreme superabundance of divine being 
with its presence through essence in everything which is not Him, 
without mediation, whether dialectic or of any other kind. 
And here also interesting comparisons can be made between the 
vision of creation of Thomas with other metaphysical doctrines of 
creation, such as the rationalist theory of Leibniz, which 
constitutes, as is well known, the paradigm of an essentialist vision 
of creation.90 The comparison of one doctrine with the other 
constitutes a fruitful method of research, which produces patent 
and unequivocal results, since it underlines aspects which in 
themselves would be difficult to draw out. This comparative 
analysis, as has already been mentioned, has been performed 
among St. Thomas and a large part of the authors prior to and 
posterior to him, on this topic and on others, resulting in a huge 
bibliography, impossible to summarize here. 
Creation is not the actualization of any possibilia. In God, 
creation is God, and in that which is created, creation is being. In 
contrast, the rationalism of Leibniz, in saying that all the relevance 
of metaphysics falls upon the essence, arrives to possibilia or to 
essences without making any reference to their being, and even to 
assert that God is bound to choose the best among the possibilia. In 
__________________________ 
89. See M. J. SOTO, Expresión. Esbozo para la historia de una idea, 
Cuadernos de Anuario Filosófico, Serie Universitaria, nr. 15, Pamplona, 1994; an 
essay later broadened and published with the title of La recomposición del 
espejo. Análisis histórico-filosófico de la idea de expresión, Pamplona, 1995. For 
a comparison between Aquinas and Spinoza on this key point of the relations 
between finite and infinite, and a pertinent critique of the Spinozian doctrine from 
a Thomistic point of view, cf. A. L. GONZÁLEZ, El Absoluto como causa sui en 
Spinoza, 3rd ed., Pamplona, 2000. 
90. For a comparative viewpoint between Thomas Aquinas and Leibniz with 
respect to the elements which intervene in the metaphysical explanation of the 
notion of creation, see my article “Presupuestos metafísicos del Absoluto Creador 
en Leibniz,” in Las demostraciones de la existencia de Dios según Leibniz, 2nd 
ed., Pamplona, 2005, pp. 17-41. 
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a metaphysics of being, in contrast, this makes no sense, not only 
because the freedom of God cannot be limited by anything, but 
also because essence is understood as something unavoidably 
referred to being, and in addition it is not essence but rather being 
which is the proper term of the divine creative action. That which 
is created certainly is everything, but creation has as its primary 
object the influentiam essendi, and by means of being, the thing 
(essence) created. God, in giving being, produces that which 
receives being, as Thomas Aquinas stated in a splendid 
expression. But it is necessary to distinguish with all caution —as 
Gilson elegantly emphasized— between the essential possibility 
and the existential possibility. The latter is not reachable via the 
former, but rather vice versa: 
“Many metaphysicians seem to imagine that an 
essence cannot exist until it has received all its 
determinations, and as soon as it has received them, it 
must burst out into existence, or at the very least, 
receive it. So, a double error is responsible for this 
illusion. The first is not to see that being complete in 
the order of essence does not bring the essence an inch 
towards existence. A completely perfect possible 
continues to still be a pure possibility. The second 
error is to forget that the essence of a possible being 
necessarily includes possible existence, by means of 
which it achieves its essential determination.”91 
Essence or the possible is not the highest metaphysical grade, 
through which we should understand all the other concepts of 
reality. In addition, Leibniz emphasized that creation is ex nihilo, 
while still presupposing possibles or essences. It is not clear how 
both assertions can be made compatible. It seems rather that the 
philosopher from Hannover falls into the difficulty already rejected 
by St. Thomas, when he affirmed that it is an error to think that the 
fact that God can create something in some way is equivalent to 
something being able to be created by God, since if things were so, 
__________________________ 
91. E. GILSON, El ser y los filósofos, Pamplona, 1979, pp. 270-271. 
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there would either exist an eternal potential for the creature, or else 
God could not create anything.92 Against the Leibnizian optimism, 
it is necessary to note, with Aquinas, that God can make better 
things than that which he actually makes, given that he does not 
need anything in order to create out of his infinite active potency. 
I consider that Thomistic metaphysics, with the perspective I 
have alluded to here, can continue exploring new paths, continually 
intensifying and deepening, which reveal themselves to the 
speculative investigation. I take the risk here of mentioning two 
large areas which will be promising and beneficial for speculative 
investigation: the theory of the divine names, which certainly 
includes the doctrine of divine ideas93 (in theodicy), and the 
articulation of the modal concepts of possibility, existence, 
necessity and contingency (in ontology). The great metaphysical 
problem of modal ontology, of the concept of possibility, 
contingency and necessity, is its “conjugation,” or if preferred, the 
articulation and unfolding of each modality based on the first, since 
it is clear that a hierarchical structuring of modality exists, which 
later can be extended to problems in theodicy. Generally speaking, 
Thomistic modal metaphysics is still nearly unknown, although 
there exist excellent monographs, such as that which was recently 
published by S. Argüello.94 
 
__________________________ 
92. See THOMAS AQUINAS, De veritate, q. 2, a. 10, ad 2: “Unde non 
sequitur quod Deum creare posse aliquid idem sit quod aliquid posse creari ab 
ipso: alias, antequam creatura esset, nihil creare potuisset, nisi creaturae potentia 
praexisteret.” That which I note in this text is further developed in my study 
Presupuestos metafísicos del Absoluto Creador en Leibniz cit., and in my article, 
which is also a comparison between Thomist and Leibnizian doctrines, “Lo 
meramente posible,” in Anuario Filosófico, (1994), pp. 345-364. 
93. See, among other studies, and besides those cited by Geiger and Wippel, 
that of V. BOLAND, Ideas in God According to Saint Thomas Aquinas. Sources 
and Synthesis, Leiden, 1996. 
94. See S. ARGÜELLO, La posibilidad y el principio de plenitud en Tomás 
de Aquino, Pamplona, 2005. There is in this work a pertinent and updated 
bibliography concerning modal metaphysics and Thomism. See also, in regards to 
the logical-metaphysical problem of modality, A. LLANO, Metafísica y lenguaje, 
2nd ed., Pamplona, 1997. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The contemporary crisis of metaphysics, which has lasted two 
centuries now, ever since Kant, was —as is well known— 
diagnosed splendidly by Hegel. As E. Alarcón has noted,95 “if in 
two centuries metaphysics has not resolved its crisis, it is obvious 
that the way of confronting it has been ineffective. With the 
permission of Lampedusa, something has to change so that 
everything does not stay the same,” and if a metaphysics is 
possible which is a genuine science, such change cannot take place 
in its object, but only in its method.96 My proposal is even prior to 
the consideration of method, and is surely not very speculative. It 
consists simply of adopting a mood or attitude: that of anchoring 
ourselves in that optimism of Fides et ratio, outlined for us in 
paragraph nr. 56: 
“I must enliven the philosophers, Christians or not, to 
trust in the capacity of human reason and not to fix 
goals which are too modest for their philosophy.” 
And in paragraph 95 we read: 
“The truth never can be limited by time or culture: it 
is known in history, but it surpasses that very history.” 
To trust in the power of reason: let us remember that famous 
passage of the Thomistic commentary on the Book of Job 
(certainly very much in the style of the so-called post-Auschwitz 
thought): “cum Deo disputare cupio” (“I desire to argue with 
God”). Thomas begins by emphasizing, in his glosses, that such an 
affirmation seems to be an illegitimate boldness, but he follows by 
saying that the difference between the interlocutors does not have 
any effect upon the truth of what they say. If what one says is truth, 
nobody can prevail over him, whoever may be his opponent in the 
discussion. This text is included in The Thomism, by Gilson; I am 
__________________________ 
95. E. ALARCÓN, “Sobre el método en Metafísica,” in J. ARANGUREN; ET 
AL. (eds.), Fe y razón, Pamplona, 1999, pp. 267-277. 
96. Ibidem. 
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in agreement with his comment that we must “participate in the 
admiration that Saint Thomas himself experienced when faced with 
a reasoning whose truth is so absolutely certain that it could be 
affirmed even before God Himself, because the principles on 
which it is nourished are the same in the creature and the 
Creator. One cannot imagine a more surprising expression of 
confidence in the power of God”.97 
We are called to trust in truth and in reason, without fainting 
nor being overcome by fear, because with respect to the truth, there 
is no such thing as exaggeration in its pursuit.98 I consider that the 
metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas can help in this, since it unites the 
characteristics that are essential for this task: speculative precision 
and rigor, confidence in reason and courage in the search of truth, 
with exquisite attention to the immensity of new and 
uninvestigated problems, which arise continually with any new 
progress in any of the various areas of philosophy. The great 
philosophers are always our contemporaries. As Thomas Aquinas 
has said, “diversitas temporum significatorum non diversificat 
veritatem.”99 Metaphysics offers us this metacultural scope of 
truth. 
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__________________________ 
97. See E. GILSON, El tomismo, 4th Spanish ed., Pamplona, 2002, p. 44. 
98. Splendid considerations on truth, along the indicated lines, can be found 
in L. POLO, “La verdad como inspiración,” in La persona humana y su 
crecimiento cit., pp. 197-206. See also E. ALARCÓN, “El debate sobre la verdad,” 
in P. PÉREZ-ILZARBE; R. LÁZARO (eds.), Verdad, bien y belleza, Cuadernos de 
Anuario Filosófico, nr. 103, Pamplona 2000, pp. 35-62. 
99. In Sent., lib. IV, d. 2, q. 2, a 1. 
